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SOME CONFUSING MATTERS RELATING TO
ARBITRATION IN WASHINGTON
WESLEY A. STURGES AND WILLIAM W. STURGES*
A RvIEw of the case law and statutes of the state of Washington
relating to arbitration points up several issues which are of im-
portance to those who may become concerned with arbitrations in the
state of either commercial or labor controversies. Some of these issues
result from the views which were advanced by the supreme court
relating to the arbitration statute of 1881. These issues are still open,
although that statute was repealed by the present act, which was origi-
nally enacted in 1943. Other uncertainties inhere in the views which
have been advanced by the court since the enactment of the present
arbitration statute, and still others relate to the intent of the statute
after the 1947 amendment of the first section.
These matters of uncertainty are bound to plague any lawyer who is
called upon to advise any client whether or not to enter upon any arbi-
tration agreement or upon any arbitration. And in the case of employ-
ees (or their union) and employers who would agree upon grievance
machinery and arbitration provisions in their collective agreements,
there is question whether or not their agreement or any arbitrations or
awards thereunder will be honored by the courts.
These questions may be summarized as follows:
1. Does the present arbitration statute operate to exclude common
law arbitration, or may the parties elect to arbitrate under the statute
or at common law?
2. May employers and their employees (or their unions) qualify
their agreements for grievance procedures and arbitration under the
present statute? What are the consequences of their arbitration agree-
ments and any arbitrations and awards thereunder?
History and Scope of Statute. The present general arbitration statute
was enacted in 1943.1 It repealed the earlier arbitration act of 1881.2
The first section of the original act of 1943 was amended in 1947.1
*Wesley A. Sturges, Dean, Yale Law School; William W. Sturges, Student,
Columbia Law School. The substance of the present monograph is now planned by
Dean Sturges to constitute a part of his forthcoming text on arbitration.
I Wash. Laws 1943, c. 138, §§ 1-23; REM. REv.STAT. §§ 430-1 et seq. (Supp. 1943)
[P.P.C. §§ 8-31 et seq.].
2 Wash. Code 1881, c. 20, §§ 264-274; Rm. Rav. STAT. §§ 420-430.
3 Wash. Laws 1947, c. 209, § 1; REm. Ray. STAT. § 430-1 (Supp. 1947).
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The effect of this amendment is more fully reviewed below. As there
appears, the 1947 amendment created some uncertainty as to whether
or not the statute is applicable, or can be made applicable, to agree-
ments between employees (or their union) and their employer to arbi-
trate what are commonly called labor controversies.
Labor matters aside, the statute purports to embrace: (1) provi-
sions in written agreements to settle by arbitration controversies which
may thereafter arise in relation to such an agreement and (2) written
agreements of submission of existing controversies which might be the
subject of an action between the parties. It declares that such arbitra-
tion agreements shall be "valid, enforceable and irrevocable," and
provides specific remedies to effectuate that declaration. These reme-
dies include motion proceedings to stay any action upon a cause em-
braced in such agreements, to require a recalcitrant party to carry out
his part of the arbitration agreement, and to procure court appoint-
ment of arbitrators when a party fails or refuses to participate in the
original appointment or in filling a vacancy of the arbitral board. Pro-
visions also are made for the confirmation, vacation and correction of
awards in motion proceedings. Accordingly, the statute follows the
general pattern of the arbitration statutes of Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode IslanZl, and
Wisconsin."
I
EFFECT OF THE STATUTE UPON CommON LAW AIRBITRATION
There are no provisions in the general statute which expressly re-
serve or outlaw the privilege of parties to arbitrate outside the statute
as at common law. If parties enter into an arbitration agreement which
does not qualify under the statute, or if they stipulate in connection
with an agreement which otherwise complies with the statute that it
shall not apply, it seems that the agreement and any arbitral proceed-
ings and award thereunder should be accorded validity according to
common law.
This conclusion is open to question, however, because of the recur-
ring thesis advanced by the supreme court during the life of the prior
arbitration statute that common law arbitration was supplanted. The
4 See also United States Arbitration Act, 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et
sreq. (1946).
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court advanced the view from time to time that the earlier arbitration
statute was intended to cover the whole subject of arbitration to the
exclusion of common law arbitration. This view tended to indicate that
arbitration agreements which did not qualify under the statute and
arbitral proceedings thereunder were legal nullities. Like the present
statute the earlier one did not purport to reserve or to outlaw common
law arbitration.'
It may, of course, be urged that the foregoing thesis will be given
effect in connection with the present statute. It seems, however, that it
should be abandoned. There are several reasons for this conclusion.
In the first place, since the court has consistently recognized and
held, as have the courts of other jurisdictions, that the arbitral process
is predicated upon, and is in furtherance of, the voluntary contract of
the parties to arbitrate, and since the arbitration statute does not
expressly outlaw common law arbitration, it seems of dubious validity
for the court to strike down the freedom of contract of the parties and
deny their privilege to choose either statutory or nonstatutory (com-
mon law) arbitration. The court does not appear to have assigned any
substantial reasons why it ought to do so. It has referred to inconveni-
ences attending common law rules of revocability of arbitration agree-
ments and those attending the necessity of enforcing a common law
award by original action.' But if parties desire to contract for arbitra-
tion with such law in view, it is not clear why they should not be
allowed to do so. Certainly it was not necessary to abolish common law
arbitration in toto in order to overcome the inconveniences attending
traditional common law rules of revocability or those making necessary
the institution of an original action to enforce a common law award.
This does not argue for restitution of the traditional common law rules
of revocability and nonenforceability of arbitration agreements, which
were largely overcome in Washington at an early date by the decisions
of the supreme court." But if parties enter into an arbitration agree-
5 That this view has been contrary to that of other American jurisdictions see, e.g.,
McClelland v. Hammond, 12 Colo. App. 82, 548-538 (1898), approved it Hilley v.
Tuttle, 52 Colo. 121, 125, 117 Pac. 896 (1911), ANN. CAS. 1913W 196. STURGES,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, § 1.6 Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Construction Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129 (1916).
7 Prior to the enactment of the present statute the Supreme Court had refused to
apply traditional common law rules of revocability at least to provisions in written
general commercial contracts to arbitrate future disputes arising between the parties.
They were held irrevocable. Zindorf Const. Co. v. Western Am. Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67
Pac. 374 (1901) (revocability by action denied) ; Herring-Hall Marvin Safe Co. v.
Purcell Safe Co., 81 Wash. 592, 142 Pac. 1153 (1914), affd on rehearing, 86 Wash.
694, 150 Pac. 1162 (1915) (same); Wager v. Odden, 148 Wash. 188, 268 Pac. 151(1928) (same) ; State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927)
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ment which does not qualify under the statute, and therefore does not
become irrevocable or enforceable as therein provided, or if they stipu-
late in an arbitration agreement otherwise qualifying under the statute
for its- revocability or nonenforceability in one or more particulars, or
that the arbitration shall be according to common law rather than
according to the statute, it seems that their agreement should be
respected. This issue is, of course, of special importance to employees
(or their unions) and their employers if it shall finally be determined,
as the supreme court seems to have indicated, that they cannot invoke
the statute nor qualify their arbitration agreements, arbitrations or
awards othei-wise than as "appraisements."
In the second place, with the exception of the cases of Smith v. The
Department of Labor and Industries," Owen v. Casey,' and Fisher
Flouring Mills Co. v. United States,"0 which are discussed below, the
declarations of the court, that common law arbitration has ceased to
exist in the state, have been used only in general exposition and dictum.
Except for these cases, the court's views havesnot been applied to the
extent of holding that when parties entered into an arbitration agree-
ment which did not qualify under the statute, or that when parties
stipulated in connection with an agreement which otherwise complied
with the statute that it should not apply in one or more particulars, or
at all, the agreement and any arbitral proceedings and award there-
under were void because they were a common law arbitration outside
the statute.
(revocability by notice denied). See also, Van Home v. Watrous, 10 Wash. 525, 39
Pac. 136 (1895); Jackson v. Walla Walla, 130 Wash. 96, 226 Pac. 487 (1924). Cf.
Sullivan v. Boeing Aircraft Co., 29 Wn. (2d) 397, 187 P. (2d) 312 (1947) (revocability
of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement. It is reviewed below
in this article.) These provisions did not appear to qualify under the terms of the then
existing arbitration statute, which did not mention future disputes provisions, but
seemed to embrace only written agreements for the submission of existing contro-
versies. Apparently, however, the court came to regard such provisions for arbitration
as fit basis for sustaining an arbitration under the statute. See Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha
v. Carstens Packing Co., 116 Wash. 630, 200 Pac. 327 (1921) ; Zindorf Const Co. v.
Western Am. Co., supra; State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, supra.
No decisions have been discovered prior to the enactment of the present arbitration
act in which the court determined whether a provision for arbitration in a written con-
tract was specifically enforceable, or whether application would lie for court appoint-
ment of one or more arbitrators to carry out an arbitration under such a provision.
Ex parte arbitrations and award under such provisions were sustained as valid and
enforceable under the arbitration statute. Zindorf Const. Co. v. Western Am. Co.,
supra; Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. Carstens Packing Co., supra; State ex rel. Fancher
v. Everett, supra.
No decisions hive been discovered determining whether agreements for submission
to arbitration of existing disputes, qualifying or not qualifying under the former arbi-
tration statute, were revocable or irrevocable, enforceable or nonenforceable.
8 176 Wash. 569, 30 P.(2d) 656 (1934).
9 48 Wash. 673, 94 Pac. 473 (1908).
10 17 F.(2d) 232 (C.C.A. 9th 1927).
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And finally, as appears in Gord v. F. S. Harmon & Co.,11 which is
more fully considered below, the court, being under pressure of judi-
cial conscience to facilitate the amicable settlement of controversies,
held valid certain agreements for arbitration between employers and
unions of their employees and awards rendered thereunder, although,
according to the court, they could not comply with the former arbitra-
tion statute because the labor controversies which were involved could
not be submitted under the statute. There being no common law arbi-
tration by the view of the court, it sustained the agreements and pro-
ceedings by assigning them to the confused and indeterminate category
of "appraisement." The court so ruled although the parties' agreement
expressly provided for arbitration. If common law "appraisement,"
when agreed upon by the parties, could survive, why could not common
law arbitration survive? And if common law "appraisement" could
survive under an agreement for arbitration, why could not common
law arbitration survive under such agreement? The justification under
Washington law for this ormal discrimination has not been established
by the court.
The doctrine in question was first voiced by the court in Dickie
Mfg. Co. v. Sound Construction Co." The parties had accomplished
a submission agreement which qualified under the former statute;
arbitration was had thereunder; award was rendered; and in proceed-
ings pursuant to the statute the award had been confirmed and put in
judgment. Plaintiff filed no exceptions, though permitted by the statute
to do so, in opposition to the entry of judgment on the award. There-
after plaintiff sued as at common law to vacate the award and judg-
ment. The court affirmed the ruling of the court below which had sus-
tained demurrer to the complaint. Substantially the same issue already
had been decided the same way in McElroy v. Hooper."3 The plaintiff
in this earlier case sought to vacate an adverse award and judgment
entered pursuant to the arbitration statute, by petition under R~m.
Rzv. STAT. § 464 [P.P.C. § 71-1]. As in the Dickie Mfg. Co. case, the
petition was predicated upon causes which the plaintiff had not
asserted in any exceptions against confirming the award. One of those
grounds was to the effect that the arbitrators did not decide all matters
submitted to them. Denial of the petition was sustained without refer-
11188 Wash. 134, 61 P.(2d) 1294 (1936).
12 92 Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129 (1916).
1s 70 Wash. 347, 126 Pac. 925 (1912).
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ence by the court to the thesis subsequently advanced in the Dickie
Mfg. Co. case.
In so putting an end to litigation attacking awards and judgments
which have been judicially affirmed and entered as provided in the
arbitration statute and with full regard for the requirements of due
process, the actual decisions of the court seem entirely meritorious.
The plaintiff in the Dickie Mfg. Co. case, however, had alleged in his
complaint (to which there was the demurrer) that, among other causes
for vacating the award and judgment, the parties had agreed orally
that the arbitration should be at common law and not under the statute.
Accordingly it was argued that it was inequitable for the defendant to
have the award confirmed by the statutory procedure and judgment
entered thereon. It was with reference to this allegation in particular
that the court first brought in the general thesis now under considera-
tion. Said the court:
Everything the plaintiff now complains of could have been reached by
statutory exceptions. These were wholly omitted. Accordingly the suit
before us can be maintained only on the theory that there was no statutory
arbitration to begin with or that it had finally become void. On both points
we must hold decidedly against plaintiff. In the face of so complete an act as
ours we are clear, and find this proper occasion to say, that common law
arbitration does not exist in this state and tha the plain purpose of our
legislation was to clear much unsettled practice by codifying arbitration.
The agreement, quite ample to engage this statute, says not a word exclud-
ing it or referring to a different kind. It is of little moment if anything was
said by the parties after they had signed the arbitration agreement. Their
minds had already met upon the statute. (Italics supplied)
The court again remarked as follows:
Much confusion has been brought into our arbitration practice by com-
mon law doctrines and decisions under statutes of other states, nor have the
opinions of this court been entirely harmonious.
That common law arbitration was excluded by our statute is plain. For
instance, either party under the former could repudiate the proceedings
before an award was actually returned, and even afterwards, should he
refuse to pay it, there was nothing left the prevailing party but to bring a
suit upon it. Both these burdensome rights are in express terms swept away,
for the statute makes the arbitration a preliminary part of judicial hearing,
the award in a sense automatically passing into judgment unless the losing
party can persuade the court to modify or set it aside. Nor is there even
recognized or suggested the right of revoking the award at any stage, of
independent suit to cancel it, or of proceedings that ignore it. On the con-
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trary, the act directly provides, as we haire seen, for excellent internal
review.
Following a review of some earlier cases, which does not seem to be
of aid in clarifying or particularizing the intent of the court's over-all
thesis upon the supplanting of common law arbitration in the state, the
view is reiterated as follows:
Those who enter into arbitration accept in advance the jurisdiction of the
superior court. The board is a preliminary, voluntarily created tribunal or
referee, and the jurisdiction of the superior court is first to be exerted in a
revisory capacity and only when appealed to by exceptions. If it cannot
adequately correct errors on the exceptions, it may take the whole contro-
versy over and proceed without a jury. Common law arbitration has ceased
to exist. If there is no proper agreement under the statute, then there is no
arbitration at all. (Italics supplied)
In evaluating the significance of this general thesis in the foregoing
case, it seems fit to conclude that it was unnecessary to the determina-
tion of the precise issue in the case; it seems to have served at most as
only a remote argumentative factor in that determination. As the court
pointed out, the agreement of submission qualified under the statute,
it was "quite ample to engage" the statute, and not a word was said in
the agreement limiting or displacing the application of the statute.
Accordingly was the thesis of the abolition of common law arbitration
hypothetical to the case at hand. It seems that the court fully denied
the basis of the plaintiff's complaint when it resolved that, "It is of
little moment if anything was said by the parties after they had signed
the arbitration agreement. Their minds had already met upon the
statute." It is not clear how the thesis of the abolition of common law
arbitration facilitated the feasibility or plausibility of this ruling on the
evidentiary conclusiveness of the agreement. And, to repeat, the thesis
was not even voiced in deciding substantially the same issue in the
same way in the earlier case of McElroy v. Hooper.
In Suksdorf v. Suksdor 14 the court again declared its view that,
"common law arbitrations have been entirely supplanted by our statu-
tory regulations on the subject," citing the Dickie Mfg. Co. case. The
court also approached the reality of its thesis by again touching upon
the point of whether an arbitration agreement not qualifying under the
statute and arbitral proceedings and award -thereunder would be void.
The court suggested the possibility as follows: "Possibly it might fol-
1493 Wash. 667, 161 Pac. 465 (1916).
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low from this that, if the submission was insufficient under the statute
the entire proceedings would be a nullity; but, as we have indicated, we
cannot conclude that this agreement was thus insufficient."
The views of the court were advanced in the Suksdorf case under the
following circumstances: a money award had been confirmed over
exceptions by the respondent and judgment entered thereon-all in
conformity with the arbitration statute. The respondent then "filed a
motion to vacate the judgment and order affirming the award" in the
superior court on the ground "that the agreement to arbitrate contained
no express stipulation that the parties thereto would abide by or per-
form the award." The lower court granted the motion and vacated the
judgment. The supreme court reversed with instructions to reinstate
the judgment. Apparently the respondent did not include the foregoing
cause in his assignment of exceptions to the award.
It was held that the arbitration statute did not require arbitration
agreements to recite that the parties would "abide by or perform the
award" to qualify under the arbitration statute (although, as the court
concedes, a quite specific dictum in an earlier opinion strongly sug-
gested such requirement).
The foregoing thesis as to the displacement of common law arbitra-
tion was advanced by the court as follows: the respondent contended
that, even if the foregoing recital was not necessary to qualify an arbi-
tration agreement under the arbitration statute, the agreement in
question was one at common law rather than under the statute because
"the agreement nowhere discloses that it is the intent of the parties to
follow the statutory procedure." Instead of disposing of this argument
on the ground that nothing in the arbitration statute required or pro-
vided for any disclosure of such intent beyond the making of the
arbitration agreement as therein set forth, the court met the argument
by challenging its assumption that common law arbitration obtained
in the state. The court remarked that it had recently ruled that "com-
mon law arbitrations have been entirely supplanted."
Once again, it will be observed that the court employed its thesis
only arguendo; it has not yet been put into effect by a ruling that
parties who enter into an arbitration agreement which does not comply
with the arbitration statute, or who stipulate in an arbitration agree-
ment otherwise qualifying under the statute that it shall not apply in
one or more particulars, or at all, commit a legal nullity.
The court next advanced its general view in Puget Sound Bridge &
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Dredging Co. v. Frye.15 The case came up on appeal from a judgment
entered upon an award pursuant to the arbitration statute. No issue
was raised that the agreement, arbitral proceedings or award, did not
comply with the arbitration statute beyond assignment in the excep-
tions that the arbitrator committed various errors of law and fact. The
court below overruled the exceptions, confirmed the award and entered
judgment. The court advanced its thesis of there being no common
law arbitration in the state quite incidentally and, apparently, only by
way of preface to its statement of the general principle that in review-
ing such statutory awards on appeal under the arbitration statute the
rights of the parties are deemed to be governed by the arbitration
statute. The court said, "Construing these statutes [certain sections of
the arbitration statute just previously quoted in the opinion], this
court has held that there is in this state no such thing as a common law
arbitration; that the proceeding is wholly statutory; and that the
rights of the parties to the proceeding are governed and controlled by
the statute," citing and quoting from the Dickie Mfg. Co. case.
To repeat, it seems quite clear that the general thesis, as voiced in
the foregoing quotation, had no other consequence in the case than to
serve as some indudement or argumentative reinforcement of the gen-
eral statement of principle that in a statutory arbitration the rights of
the parties to the proceeding are governed by the statute in so far as
the statute may bear expression.
The view of the court was next stated in Smith v. The Department
of Labor and Industries."8 The case came to the court on appeal from
a judgment of the superior court which had increased the amount of an
award made to an injured workman under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act.
The workman originally presented his claim to the Department of
Labor and Industries and disability was classified by it as permanent
partial of nine degrees. Being dissatisfied therewith, he applied to the
joint board of the department for rehearing. The application was
granted and hearing had by the board in January, 1931. While this pro-
ceeding was pending the Department of Labor and Industries and the
claimant entered into a written arbitration agreement to arbitrate the
extent of his disability. The arbitrators returned an unverified report
to the Department finding claimant's disability as permanent partial
of 5Y per cent. Thereafter the joint board concluded its foregoing
15 142 Wash. 166, 252 Pac. 546 (1927).
16 176 Wash. 569, 30 P.(2d) 656 (1934).
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proceedings by awarding further increase in his disability rating. It
based its award upon the transcript of testimony taken before it in
January, 1931, and upon the unverified report of the arbitrators.
Claimant then appealed to the superior court and after hearing, but
without additional testimony, the court entered judgment for a still
greater degree of disability. Upon appeal from this judgment to the
supreme court by the Department of Labor and Industries one assign-
ment of error to the action of the court below made the point that the
claimant was bound "by the arbitration agreement." Since the arbi-
trators are reported to have "filed an unverified report" it seems more
probable that the foregoing assignment was directed to the point that
claimant was concluded by the arbitrators' award or "report." While
the arbitration agreement had been in writing, apparently no steps had
been taken to have the award confirmed as provided in the arbitration
statute, nor had the arbitrators been sworn in compliance with the
statute.
In denying the conclusiveness of the award the court observed: "It
is enough to say that, because of REm. Rxv. STAT. §§ 420 et seq., [the
arbitration statute] common law arbitration does not exist," citing the
Dickie Mfg. Co. case; and that it could not be sustained as a valid
statutory award because of the foregoing items of noncompliance with
the statute. Perhaps this decision should be reckoned as one which
gives direct effect to the court's thesis that common law arbitration
was banished from the state during the life of the prior arbitration
statute. This part of the opinion comes seriously close; the thesis be-
comes more than a general exposition or remote argumentative factor.
On the other hand, the court followed its foregoing opinion with a
reference to and quotation from provisions of the statute 1 7 requiring
that rehearings before the joint board of the Department of Labor and
Industries be de novo and summary, "but no witness' testimony shall
be received unless he shall first have been sworn." The court concluded
that because of this statutory requirement the unverified report of the
arbitrators could not be used by the board for any purpose. By the
same token, it seems that, because of this statutory provision, no
unverified common law or statutory award could have been relied upon
in support of the Department's case or its appeal.
Perhaps it should be concluded that, while the court might have
denied the Department's foregoing assignment of error on this second
17 RIZm. REv. STAT. § 7697 [P.P.C § 704-1].
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ground, it did not do so for the very purpose of giving direct effect to
its foregoing general thesis by ruling the award in an arbitration not
conforming with the statute to be a nullity. On the other hand, it seems
clear that, notwithstanding this decision, the court may be free gen-
erally to accord freedom of contract of parties in the premises and to
permit them to contract with legal effect for nonstatutory arbitration.
The actual decision to give the award no effect does not seem to rest
exclusively or indispensably upon the general thesis.
In the earlier case of Owen v. Casey"8 the court had passed upon a
similar situation in which the conclusiveness of an award was put in
issue as follows: defendants pleaded an arbitration and award to defeat
an action brought against them to foreclose a labor lien. Held, that the
answer was subject to demurrer because it "failed to allege any written
agreement for arbitration, any award filed with the clerk of the supe-
rior court, or any approval of the same by the court." (Filing of an
award and confirmation by the court were steps provided in the arbi-
tration statute for enforcement of a statutory award.) The court made
this judgment without mention of its general view about common law
arbitration being supplanted. It was decided, of course, before the
Dickie Mfg. Co. case in which the doctrine seems first to have been
voiced. The decision lends itself, however, to being cited as a direct,
though undeclared, application of the court's general doctrine.
In Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. United States 9 issue was raised as
in the last two cases, as to whether or not an award was conclusive
upon the defendant who sought by counterclaim to put in litigation
claims which were deemed to have been embraced in the arbitration
and award. It does not appear whether or not the arbitration agree-
ment qualified under the statute, nor whether the arbitrators and pro-
ceedings followed the statute. No steps had been taken, however, to
have the award confirmed under the statute nor to have judgment
entered thereon. The court took the position that on these facts (the
award being unconfirmed and without judgment) it was not conclusive
as a statutory award and that it did not preclude the litigation of the
original cause or any part of it.2 The court appears to have relied upon
the general thesis of the Supreme Court of Washington in holding that
Is 48 Wash. 673, 94 Pac. 473 (1908).
19 17 F.(2d) 232 (C.C.A. 9th 1927).
20 Under the present statute it seems that substantial parts of the rulings in Owen v.
Casey and Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. United States are overcome by the last sen-
tence of REm. Rav. STAT. § 430-15 (Supp. 1943), which reads as follows: "The validity
of an award, otherwise valid, shall not be affected by the fact that no motion is made
to confirm it."
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the award was of no consequence as a common law award. The court
cited the Dickie Mfg. Co. and Suksdorf cases for the proposition that,
"it has become the settled law of that jurisdiction that common law
arbitrations are entirely supplanted by the state statute." The court
expressly undertooketo follow the state law in its decision and recog-
nized its binding effect in the federal court. It could have arrived at
the same result without sponsoring the foregoing thesis by relying upon
Owen v. Casey.
We next come to the case of Gord v. F. S. Harmon & Co." In Octo-
ber, 1934, the employees of various manufacturers went on strike. In-
creased wages were among the demands of the employees. An official of
the United States Department of Labor intervened and induced the em-
lloyers' association and the unions of the striking employees to refer
their disputes to the Regional Labor Board; written agreement was
consummated between the parties for the arbitration of their contro-
versies and a panel of three arbitrators was established. The agreement
was for arbitration and the panel was designated as a panel of arbitra-
tors. The board returned an award which fixed the rates of wages to be
paid. The new rates were higher than the old rates. By the terms of the
arbitration agreement, the wage rates fixed by the award were to be
retroactive to an earlier date on which the striking employees returned
to work. Upon delivery of the award the employers rejected it. Action
was instituted by several employees against their employers to recover
the excess over the old rates which had accrued under the rates fixed
in the award for the foregoing period.
A first defense against the action as considered by the court was that
the award was invalid because the arbitration did not conform to the
arbitration statute. In what particulars it did not conform to the
statute is not disclosed in the court's opinion. The court readily volun-
teereed the view, moreover, that such an arbitration could not conform
to the statute. Said the court, "The statute referred to is wholly inap-
plicable to the adjustment of a labor dispute between an employer and
employees. It contemplates such an arbitration that, when the award is
filed with the clerk of the superior court, judgment may be entered
thereon and execution issued. In view of the statute referred to [the
arbitration statute] it has been held by this court that there was not, in
this state, what is known as a common law arbitration,"-citing the
Dickie Mfg. Co. case, among others. (Italics supplied) (The position
21188 Wash. 134, 61 P.(2d) 1294 (1936).
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of the court that the arbitration statute was "wholly inapplicable to the
adjustment of a labor dispute between an employer and employees"
is discussed below.)
Although the general thesis of the nonexistence of common law arbi-
tration was so reiterated, nevertheless, the court sustained the validity
of the award and affirmed the money judgment of the court below in
favor of the plaintiffs.
The court resolved its dilemma by classifying the "arbitration" as an
"appraisement."
Said the court:
Even though the arbitration here did not, and could not, have conformed
to the statute, and there is no common law arbitration in this state, it does
not follow that there is no way by which employers and employees may
settle their differences by mutually agreeing upon certain persons to make
the adjustment.
Thus far we have been using the term "arbitration," which was used in
the agreement. But what was done here was neither a statutory arbitration
nor a common law arbitration. It is what is referred to in the books as an
appraisement. (Italics supplied)
These questions seem pertinent: in view of the readiness of the court
to recognize the validity of employers and employees mutually agree-
ing upon certain persons to adjudge their controversies by "appraise-
ment," outside the arbitration statute, why might they not mutually
agree upon common law arbitration? Upon what basis may this dis-
crimination in the privilege of contract be justified? The court has not
given the answers to these questions.
The position of the court as to the nonexistence of common law arbi-
tration in the state was next stated in In re Arbitration Puget Sound
Bridge &,Dredging Co.2 It is there declared that "Contrary to the
practice and procedure in the vast majority of the states, this jurisdic-
tion does not recognize or permit common law arbitration, one of the
distinguishing features of which is that an agreement for such arbi-
tration is revocable. In this state, the proceeding is wholly statutory,
and the rights of the parties thereto are governed and controlled by
statutory provisions."
Careful study of the issues presented on the appeal and of the deter-
mination of them by the court fails to disclose the pertinency, even
arguendo, of the restatement of the matter. The above statement identi-
fies common law arbitration with the common law rules of revocability
221 Wn.(2d) 401, 96 P.(2d) 257 (1939).
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of agreements for such arbitration. But the court had been quite effec-
tive in repudiating these rules in earlier cases in which the precise
question was presented. 3 With these rules of revocability already over-
come, why should it be deemed necessary to repudiate arbitral pro-
ceedings and awards had in accordance with rules of the common law,
or other rules as might be agreed upon by the parties, outside the stat-
ute? The court has never made any clear answer to this question.
In view of the dubious position of the foregoing thesis as it appears
in the above cases decided while the former arbitration statute was in
effect, it seems reasonable to urge that in connection with the new
statute parties should be accorded the privilege, as in other jurisdic-
tions, to choose whether to arbitrate under agreements for arbitration
and by procedures which do or do not follow the statute. If their arbi-
tration agreement qualifies under the statute, let the statute apply."'
If the parties stipulate in an arbitration agreement otherwise qualifying
under the statute that it shall not apply, let the agreement be judged as
at common law. Let the common law rulings of irrevocability of arbitra-
tion agreements as already established by the court apply to arbitration
agreements which do not qualify under the statute unless the parties in
the given case shall stipulate otherwise. (The feasibility of blacking
out common law and statutory arbitration and the substitution of
"cappraisement" in labor causes is further considered below.)
To parties concerned in using arbitration and agreements for arbitra-
tion the question whether common law arbitration is permissible will
generally assume little importance, provided the parties and subject
matter are such that the statute may be invoked. Whether or not em-
ployees (or their unions) and employers can invoke the present statute,
is not free from doubt. If parties can invoke the present statute and
the subject of dispute may be brought within the statute, it seems that
statutory arbitration will generally be preferred. There are few re-
quirements for compliance with the statute and the procedures under
the statute for enforcing the agreement, and for enforcing, correcting
or vacating an award are superior to those at common law.
28 See note 7 supra.
24 If the arbitration agreement qualifies under the statute but the proceedings there-
under fail substantially to comply with the statute, difficult questions arise as to the
fitness of recognition of the validity of an award. Should it be subject to enforcement,
or to a vacation or correction as a common law award? See STURGES, Op. Cit., Supra
note 5, §§ 5, 6.
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II
WHETHER OR NOT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS
AND EMPLOYEES ARE SUBJECT TO THE PRESENT ACT-WHAT
CAUSES MAY BE SUBMITTED THEREUNDER, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO LABOR CONTROVERSIES
General. Under the present general arbitration statute parties may
include a provision "in a written agreement" to settle by arbitration
"any controversy thereafter arising between them out of or in relation
to such agreement."" Parties also may agree in writing to submit to
arbitration "any controversy which may be the subject of an action
existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit."'"
Although the latter part of this text is somewhat ambiguous, it seems
probable that it contemplates the submission of any existing contro-
versy which might be the subject of an action and that it is not intended
to restrict the causes which may be submitted to those that are in
pending litigation between the parties.
It also may be doubted that any substantial difference in arbitrable
causes is intended by providing that parties may embrace in a future
disputes provision "any controversy" thereafter arising between them,
while the submission of an existing controversy may embrace "any
controversy which may [might] be the subject of an action."
Labor Causes. Whether or not the statute is applicable, or can be
made applicable, in any manner to arbitration agreements and arbitral
proceedings and awards involving labor controversies is made doubtful
by the obviously ambiguous second paragraph of the first section. Espe-
cially is this true when that paragraph is read in the light of its coming
into the statute in 1947 as an amendment to the corresponding para-
graph of the statute as originally enacted in 1943.
Postponing further consideration of these ambiguities in the text of
the statute for the moment, the answer to the general question of
whether or not labor controversies may be arbitrated under the statute
is further complicated by the decision and rationale of the court in
Gord v. F. S. Harmon & Co.2" It presents the preliminary question of
whether labor causes may be the subject of any arbitration or must be
allocated to the tenuous category of "appraisement." To further report
the case: employees and their employer had entered into an agreement
25 Wash. Laws 1947, c. 209, § 1; Rnz. Rav. STAT. § 430-1 (Supp. 1947).
26 Id.
27 188 Wash. 134, 61 P.(2d) 1294 (1936).
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of submission in writing for the arbitration of employees' claims for
increased rates of wages, and arbitration was had and an award for
increased rates was rendered. In an action brought by the employees
upon the award to recover a money judgment for additional wages due
according to the- arbitration agreement and award, the supreme court
affirmed the money judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as entered in the
court below. As reported above, the court saw fit, however, to declare
that the proceedings would not be counted valid as either a statutory or
common law arbitration. Instead, according to the court, they must be
recognized by what "is referred to in the books as an appraisement."28
28 The Washington court seems to have been the first (and as yet appears to be the
only) court to have projected arbitration agreements covering labor causes and the
proceedings and awards thereunder into the category of "appraisement" and out of the
category of arbitration. "Appraisement" and "appraisals" are terms whikh most com-
monly have been identified with agreements and proceedings to determine loss or
damage under property insurance contracts, and to determine the value or price of
property, such as the re-rental value of property under lease. They also have been asso-
ciated with agreements and proceedings relating to the action of architects or engineers
in the settlement of controversies arising in connection with construction, installation
and similar contracts. Even in their more traditional habitat these categores are con-
fusing and indeterminate as to when and how they are like unto and distinctive from
arbitration. For a general review of this confusion of tongues among the decided cases,
see S rRGES, ComxmERc. ARBITRATIONS AND AwAnus, §§ 7-11. The most prevalent
distinction, that appraisal clauses were held irrevocable while arbitration clauses were
revocable, ceased to exist in Washington beginning with the Zindorf case in 1901.
More specifically concerning the foregoing diversities, and by way of example, there
is a variety of judicial rulings as to whether "appraisals" of one kind or another require
that notice and opportunity of hearing shall be accorded the parties as in the case of
either common law or statutory arbitrations. See STURGES, op. Cit., supra, §§ 8, 9, 11.
In making up for "appraisements" significant differences from arbitration of labor
controversies, does the supreme court intend to go along with the decisions which have
held against the right of notice and opportunity to be heard-at least in some classes
of "appraisals"-or will it follow other authorities requiring opportunity of full hear-
ings as in arbitrations?
The court has generally indicated its solicitude in cases under the former arbitration
statute that arbitrators accord each of the parties opportunity for full hearing, and
has held that arbitrators are guilty of misbehavior and their award shall be vacated if
they deny the parties, or either of them, opportunity for fair hearing, including the
privilege of cross-examination. The parties have a right to a day in court unless they
waive it. Thus, in Brown's Exrs. v. Farnandis, 27 Wash. 232, 67 Pac. 574 (1902), the
arbitrators received written statements from the parties setting forth their respective
claims. They next "called in the parties separately, and allowed them to make explana-
tions of their own statements." From these statements and explanations the arbitrators
made up their award. The court also reports that, "there is nothing in the record to
show that Farnandis [the party challenging the award] consented to this mode of trial;
on the contrary, it appears that the arbitrators refused to permit the parties to appear
together." In holding the award invalid, the court said, "While arbitrators are not re-
quired to proceed with the formalities of a court, they must proceed in such manner as
to give a full hearing to each of the parties, not only upon the several items of the
claim presented by himself, but also upon the claim of his adversary, and upon the evi-
dence adduced in support of that claim. This they cannot do without hearing a party
and his witness in the presence of the opposing party. Unless this right is waived by
the party, either in the agreement of submission or by conduct amounting to a waiver,
an award made under such circumstances is clearly void." See also McDonald v. Lewis,
18 Wash. 300. 51 Pac. 387 (1897) ; Iri re Arbitration Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging
Co. v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 1 Wn. (2d) 401, 96 P. (2d) 257 (1939) ; and espe-
cially the opinion in Hatch v. Cole, 128 Wash. 107, 222 Pac. 463 (1924).
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This view was reaffirmed in Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co.,2 which
was very similar to the Gord case.
The court declared in the Gord case that the arbitration had not
conformed to the statute and, therefore, the award could not be sus-
tained as a statutory award, and, under its general thesis that common
law arbitration had been displaced in the state, it could not have any
validity as a common law award. The award could be sustained and
enforced as, but only as, an adjustment in an "appraisement." The
court went further, however, and declared that the earlier arbitration
statute must be deemed "wholly inapplicable to the adjustment of a
labor dispute between an employer and employees. It contemplates such
an arbitration that, when the award is filed with the clerk of the supe-
rior court, judgment may be entered thereon and execution issued." Said
the court further, "The case now before us falls under the classification
of an appraisement. So far as we are now concerned, there was an issue
submitted to the board to determine a future fact, which was wages, the
award of which should be retroactive, as above stated." (Italics sup-
plied.)
These considerations do not seem very persuasive for taking the
arbitration of controversies between employees and employer out of
the former statute. Nor would they be persuasive as support for a ruling
that such causes may not be arbitrable under the present act for like
reasons. The provisions of the two statutes in the particulars considered
by the court are substantially similar. The former statute broadly
authorized the submission of "any controversy, suit or quarrel."" True,
"judgment" was to be entered upon the award (as under the present
statute), but this did not require that the award should be such as to
support such a judgment as would, in turn, support an execution. The
statute provided that the judgment entered on an award "shall be in all
respects like any other judgment of the superior court.""1 Under exist-
ing code provisions relating to civil procedure," forms of action had
been abolished, legal and equitable relief was pursued in the one action,
and a "judgment" was the terminal of the action. These provisions
relating to civil procedure are pertinent, for the court has emphasized
that the chapter of the code relating to arbitration and award is an
integral part of the code of civil procedure. "It was enacted with the
297 Wn.(2d) 509, 110 P.(2d) 182 (1941).
s0 Wash. Code 1881, c. 20, § 264; R1 . REV. STAT. § 420.31 Wash. Code 1881, c. 20, § 274; REm. REV. STAT. § 430.
82 REm. REV. STAT. §§ 153, 255, 404, 435, 512 [P.P.C. §§ 34, 85-1, 62-1, 62-19, 48-1].
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code of civil procedure and forms an integral part thereof."83 Accord-
igly, it seems clear that the judgment entered under the arbitration
statute upon an award could and should confirm and conform to the
award according to its intent whether it be for the recovery of money
or property, the declaratory adjudication of controverted claims, or for
more executory action as in the nature of an equitable decree. Certainly
it could not have been intended by the court that the arbitration statute
contemplated only such an award as would, when entered in judgment,
sustain execution. An award, for example, denying the recovery of the
simplest controverted claim for money would support no judgment
which would sustain an execution, but such controverted claim would
have been arbitrable under the statute.
It seems equally dubious to have characterized the award in the
Gord case as the determination of "a future fact." What the court
had in mind by "a future fact" it does not explain, and the characteri-
zation of the award, theretofore rendered, as the determination of "a
future fact" is not clear. Furthermore, if arbitrators cannot make
a determination of "a future fact" it is not clear how appraisers can
do so. But the court did allow its enforcement by action-as an "ap-
raisement." If appraisers can make such determination, it is not clear
why arbitrators cannot do so.
The court also entered upon certain generalizations as to how "ap-
praisement" differs from arbitration. They are not very convincing.
Said the court, "As a rule, what is called an arbitration does not relate
to the future, and where it does so relate, it is not in the proper sense an
arbitration, but only the ascertainment of some fact as a condition
precedent to the bringing of suit." It seems clear that, at least in the
present case, neither of the parties had any purpose of going through
the arbitration in order to ascertain some fact "as a condition precedent
to the bringing of a suit." The whole program, from agreement to
award, was designed to liquidate a strike and adjudicate a wage scale
to be applied retroactively and probably for a future period, though its
length was not disclosed nor covered in the arbitration agreement. In
Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co.,"' which, as indicated above, was
very similar to the Gord case, while the court reaffirmed its position that
the arbitration was an "appraisement," it emphasized that "the essence
of the matter was to settle what was apparently a bitter dispute between
s3 Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. Carstens Packing Co., 116 Wash. 630, 200 Pac. 327(1921).
847 Wn.(2d) 509, 110 P.(2d) 182 (1941).
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employers and employees and enable the fishing to proceed, thereby
avoiding great loss to all parties concerned."
The court further declared in the Gord case that "It is an appraise-
ment, and not an arbitration, where the arbitrators or appraisers,
whichever they may be called, act in the twofold capacity of arbi-
trators and experts." It certainly is not conceded by those holding
generally accepted conceptions of arbitration that arbitrators must be
devoid of expertness. And granting there is the foregoing "twofold
capacity" of persons who are to make an award, it is not clear why it
should preclude arbitration by arbitrators of labor controversies be-
tween employees and their employer under the then existing arbitra-
tion statute authorizing the arbitration of "any controversy, suit or
quarrel."
The views of the court that the settlement of controversies between
employees and their employer must be by "appraisement," and may not
be by common law or statutory arbitration also seem out of harmony
with the views of the legislature as set down in Chapter 6 of the labor
law." By that legislation it is made the duty of the state labor commis-
sioner, if he fails in negotiating a settlement of a labor dispute between
employees and employer, to endeavor "to have said parties consent in
writing to submit their disputes to a board of arbitration." Such board
shall consist of three citizens, one selected by each party and the two
so elected to select a third. The three so selected "to constitute the
board of arbitration and the findings of said board of arbitration to be
final." (Italics supplied.) Had the legislature intended "appraisement"
and not arbitration it could easily have said so. The present arbitration
statute uses the term "arbitration," and its enactment in 1943 was after
the foregoing decisions and opinions in the Gord and Hegeberg cases.
If the legislature had intended "appraisement" and not arbitration
again it could easily have said so.
Granting, however, that labor controversies arising between employ-
ees and their employers may be amenable to settlement by arbitration
(that they are not inevitably relegated to the nebulous and indeter-
minate category of "appraisement"), there still is doubt whether or not
the arbitration agreements of such parties may come under the present
statute. While the second paragraph of the first section of the present
statute expressly purports in one part to render the act inapplicable to
arbitration agreements between employees and employers, in another
35 REm. REV. STAT. §§ 7667-7672 [P.P.C. §§ 686-1 et seq.].
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part of the same paragraph it is provided that such parties may agree
upon "any method and procedure for the settlement of existing or
future disputes and controversies" and that "any such procedure shall
be valid, enforceable and irrevocable." (Italics supplied.)
The first section of the present statute reads as follows:86
Written agreement for submission to arbitration-Validity and enforce-
ability-Agreements betiheen employers and employees or associations of
employees. Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitra-
tion, in conformity with the provisions of this act, any controversy which
may be the subject of an action existing between them at the time of the
agreement to submit, or they may include in a written agreement a provision
to settle by arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between them out
of or in relation to such agreement. Such agreement shall be valid, enforce-
able and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for
the revocation of any agreement.
The provisions of this act shall not apply to any arbitration agreement
between employers and employees, and as to any such agreement the parties
thereto may provide for any method and procedure for the settlement of
existing or future disputes and controversies, and such procedure shall be
valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist in law or
equity for the revocation of any agreement.
Granting the uncertainty of the total text of this section-and espe-
cially of the second paragraph-it seems reasonably clear that the
statute contemplates that agreements for the settlement of labor dis-
putes arising between employees and their employer and the procedure
agreed upon for their settlement may be by arbitration and may qualify
under the statute and thereby be "valid, enforceable and irrevocable"
in the manner and by the remedies provided in the statute to the extent
that they are adaptable. The following analysis of the statute leads to
this conclusion.
The present text of the last paragraph of this section came into the
statute in 1947 by way of amendment of the corresponding paragraph
in the act of 1943. The earlier paragraph reads as follows:87 "The
provisions of this act shall not apply to any arbitration agreement
between employers and employees or between employers and associa-
tions of employees, unless such agreement specifically provides that it
shall be subject to the provisions of this act."
The original text of this paragraph clearly intended that arbitration
agreements between employers and employees or their associations and
86Wash. Laws. 1947, c. 209, § 1; R m. REv. STAT. § 430-1 (Supp. 1947).
87 REm. REv. STAT. § 430-1 (Supp. 1943) [P.P.C. § 8-31].
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unions, though otherwise qualifying thereunder, should not come under
the act unless the parties expressly so stipulated therein. It is readily
inferred, on the other hand, that it was intended that if such parties did
so stipulate in an agreement for arbitration which otherwise qualified
under the act, the agreement, the arbitral proceedings and award
would be subject to the provisions of the act.
The present text seems, on first impression,. to give such parties no
opportunity to invoke the act, not even if they purport to stipulate
themselves into it. It does provide, however, that if such parties enter
into "any such agreement" (which, as a matter of context, refers to
"any arbitration agreement") ,"8 they may "provide for any method and
procedure for the settlement of existing or future disputes and contro-
versies, and such procedure shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable
save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revocation of
any agreement."
The text prompts the conclusion that the over-all intents and pur-
poses of the new paragraph are as follows: (1) To perpetuate the for-
mal exclusion, as in the original paragraph, of arbitration agreements
between employers and their employees from the statute. (Why? A
mystery.) And this exclusion, by the amendment, seems to render the
act inapplicable and unavailable in such cases even though the parties
stipulate for its application. (2) That notwithstanding this formal
exclusion, such parties may in any arbitration agreement in writing
"provide for any method and procedure for the settlement of existing or
future disputes and controversies" and "such procedure shall be valid,
enforceable and irrevocable." This second part of the paragraph seems
effectively to overcome the formal exclusion in the first part of the para-
graph (except, probably, when the parties stipulate that the act shall
not apply). It is inferred, however, that the process of amending the
paragraph was not deliberately intended to accomplish merely such
circuity. Instead, it is believed that the foregoing second part of the
paragraph was intended to serve as a positive legislative mandate to the
courts to overcome the ruling of the lower court in Sullivan v. Boeing
Aircraft Co. 9
It remains to consider in this connection the court's disposition of
88 While this text, "any arbitration agreement," might include one not in writing,
it seems probable, in view of its setting in the statute and the scope of the statute as a
whole, that an arbitration agreement in writing is intended. This conclusion is sup-
ported by reference to the first paragraph of section 1 of the 1947 amendment, and
sectiori 430-20(1) of the 1943 statute.8929 Wn.(2d) 397, 187 P.(2d) 312 (1947), 174 A.L.R. 566 (1948).
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the Sullivan case. It seems to have ruled that whether an arbitration
provision in a collective bargaining agreement and an award thereunder
were to be regarded as a valid arbitration or a valid appraisal, they
were, nevertheless, legal nullities.
The arbitration provision was treated as revocable and the award
was ignored.
Sullivan was an employee of the defendant company and a member
of International Association of Machinists and Aeronautical Industrial
District Lodge No. 751. On January 1, 1944, the union and the com-
pany entered into a written collective bargaining agreement. Included
in this agreement were provisions, among others, setting forth seniority
rights of the employees and provisions for the arbitration of grievances
arising between the parties. While the agreement was in effect, the com-
pany notified Sullivan of a change of his shift (from the "first" to the
"second") and that on May 1, 1944, he should report for work on the
second shift. Sullivan refused to work on the second shift, but stood
ready to continue on the first shift. On the date of the foregoing notice
to him, Sullivan filed written claim of grievance with the arbitrator as
provided in the general agreement. He claimed that the change of shifts
as ordered by the company was in violation of his seniority rights as
established in the general agreement. According to the court, he also
was "claiming pay for time lost because of such transfer." Apparently,
however, no claim for lost wages was included in the submission, and
the trial court set forth in its findings of fact that there was not "any
submission thereof made to arbitration." Briefs for both parties on
appeal likewise indicate that no such claim had been submitted to the
arbitrator.
The arbitration board returned its award on July 3, 1944. From
May 1, to July 13, 1944, Sullivan would not report for work on the
second shift and the company would not employ him'on the first shift.
The arbitral board ruled in favor of Sullivan's claim, holding that, on
the facts in the case and in light of the seniority provisions of the gen-
eral agreement, Sullivan was entitled to the first shift. The company
reinstated Sullivan on the first shift upon receipt of notice of the arbi-
trator's award. He then made demand upon the company for back pay.
The company refused. He thereupon instituted this action for the back
wages relying upon the award of the arbitrator that the company's
action was in breach of the provisions of the general agreement. The
plaintiff finally prevailed in the lower court and defendant appealed
from the judgment.
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The defendant relied upon the arbitration provisions to bar this
action, it being contended that those provisions were valid and irrevo-
cable and plaintiff must first submit the issue to arbitration as provided
in the general agreement. The trial judge declared and ruled that they
were invalid. He assigned no reasons for this conclusion. He also took
the position that "we are not here dealing with a case of appraisement."
As stated above, the plaintiff's action for the wages appears to have
been based upon the award and the general agreement. Recovery was
allowed by the trial court apparently on the basis that the company
had, as found in the award, wrongfully denied plaintiff's right to con-
tinue to work on the first shift, and in an amount equal to the number
of work days so lost multiplied by the wage-rate provided in the general
agreement. The supreme court reversed the lower court's ruling after
reviewing the elaborate provisions of the general agreement relating to
seniority. The court pointed out that as seniority became involved in
various different situations covered in the agreement so were various
forms of expression used to indicate how seniority was to be effective,
i.e. (1) in some the company "shall have regard to seniority," (2) in
others "will be governed by seniority," (3) in others "seniority shall
prevail," and (4) in others "seniority shall be given first opportunity."
The court concluded from the various provisions that plaintiff's situa-
tion was one in which the company should "have regard to seniority."
The court then determined, with the aid of dictionaries, that to "have
regard to" meant no more than that the company should take account
of seniority, but was not bound by it. Accordingly, the company was
held not to have violated the general agreement.
The court also took the further position that since the plaintiff had
not taken any steps to mitigate his damages he should recover nothing.
For both of these reasons, as the court said, it reversed the judgment
of the court below and directed dismissal of the action.
But what may be concluded about (1) the validity and conclusive-
ness of the arbitrator's award and (2) the declaratory ruling of the
court below that the provisions for the grievance procedure and arbitra-
tion were of no legal effect and no bar to plaintiff's action? In the brief
and argument for the company, attempt was made to obtain specific
ruling by the supreme court reversing the blanket invalidation of the
arbitration system provided in the general agreement as uttered by the
trial judge.
The supreme court refused to pass upon this matter as urged by the
company, and proceeded to decide the case as above set forth, and with-
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out purporting to invalidate or to vacate the award. No discussion in
the opinion takes account of the opinions or rulings of the court in the
Gord or Hegeberg cases, which sustained and enforced like awards. It
by-passed the award as if there were none and seemingly in reversal of
its rulings sustaining the validity and enforceability of similar awards
in the last cited cases. There is no suggestion that the arbitral board had
proceeded upon a "fundamentally wrong basis," which has been de-
clared by the court a proper cause to upset an appraiser's award."
The only reference to either of the foregoing matters (revocability
of the agreement or conclusion of the award) was as follows: "One of
the questions discussed at length in the briefs is whether the grievance
procedure which was followed in this instance constituted either a valid
arbitration or a valid appraisement, or appraisal, under the law of this
state. The authorities cited, together with some which we have added,
bearing on that question, are the following .... " The court listed the
citation of the present arbitration statute and several cases, including
the Gord and Hegeberg cases without comment upon them. The court
then concluded: "The determination of that question here, however,
would not finally dispose of this controversy; and, moreover, under our
view of the case, the result would be the same regardless of whether, or
not the grievance procedure constituted either a valid arbitration or a
valid appraisement or appraisal."
It is difficult to understand the intent of these statements. In the
first place, if the award as to the violation of seniority rights were to be
recognized as having been rendered in a valid arbitration or a valid
appraisal, it is not clear why, nor upon what ground, the court should
disregard it and proceed to its own decision of the same issue that had
been submitted to arbitration. The court assigned no reason for dis-
regarding the award; no cause to vacate it was stated nor even men-
tioned generally. Both parties apparently considered that the arbitrator
had full jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue involving the con-
struction of the provisions relating to seniority in the general agreement
and their application in the given case. Both had acted in accord with
and in reliance upon the award as rendered. Under these circumstances
it must lie in considerable mystery why the award in the case as to
plaintiff's seniority rights was by-passed and avoided so readily.4
40 See Peterson v. Granger Irr. Dist., 137 Wash. 668, 243 Pac. 847 (1926).
41 In addition to the Gord and Hegberg cases, see, e.g., School Dist. v. Sage, 13
Wash. 352, 43 Pac. 341 (1896); "McKivor v. Savage, 60 Wash. 135, 110 Pac. 811(1910) ; Sound Const. & Eng. Co. v. Green, 89 Wash. 459, 154 Pac. 791 (1916).
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In the second place, if the arbitration provision in the general agree-
ment were "valid" (as either an arbitration or appraisal provision),
the court should have held that the plaintiff's action to recover the lost
wages was barred because the plaintiff had not sought arbitration of the
claim. This is true regardless of whether or not the parties had duly
stipulated their agreement into the statute under the original second
paragraph of the first section of the statute. (The arbitration agreement
had been concluded after the effective date of the arbitration act in
1943 but before the 1947 amendment. It does not appear whether or
not the parties had stipulated that the arbitration provisions should be
subject to the act.) Even if the agreement were not governed by the
statute, it should have been held irrevocable, unless the court intended
to deny the applicability of its earlier decisions holding future disputes
provisions in general commercial contracts irrevocable, to arbitration
provisions in collective agreements between employees and employers.2
The draftsman of the 1947 amendment of the second paragraph has
advised the authors that the amendment was prompted by, and in-
tended to overcome, the blanket invalidation, as declared by the trial
judge, of grievance procedures and arbitral provisions which are in
current use in collective bargaining agreements between labor unions
and employers.
As heretofore pointed out, the amendment provides that "any method
and procedure for the settlement of existing or future disputes" set
forth in an arbitration agreement shall be "valid, enforceable and
irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the
revocation of any agreement." These are the same words as are used
in the first paragraph of the section with respect to agreements for
arbitration which do qualify directly and fully under the act. The
general declaration making such agreements "valid, enforceable and
irrevocable" takes on precise meaning under the statute when these
words are read in the light of the procedures and remedies which are
accorded by the act actually to assert their validity, enforceability
and irrevocability.48 It seems reasonable, therefore, to construe the
intent of the foregoing amendment as being to invoke the remedies
and procedures of the act, insofar as they are adaptable in the given
case, to assure and assert the declared validity, enforceability and
42 See note 7 supra; also Martin v. Vansant, 99 Wash. 106, 168 Pac. 990 (1917),
Ann. Cas. 1918D 1147; Wagner v. Peshastin Lumber Co., 149 Wash. 328, 270 Pac.
1032 (1928) (holding appraisal clauses irrevocable).
48 REm. REv. STAT. §§ 430-3, 4, 5, 6 (Supp. 1943) [P.P.C. §§ 8-35, 37, 39. 411.
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irrevocability of methods and procedures agreed upon by employees
(or their unions) and employers, for the settlement of existing or
future disputes and controversies arising between them.
It remains to note, however, that the status of the foregoing sug-
gested construction of the amendment is not free from further doubt.
As heretofore noted, on appeal in the Sullivan case, the company
sought the reversal of the ruling of the trial judge invalidating the
arbitration agreement. Furthermore, although the original paragraph
of the section and the foregoing amendment thereof were brought to
the attention of the supreme court, it declined to pass upon the ques-
tion as to.the revocability of the arbitration provision. The collective
bargaining agreement between the parties with its provisions for
handling grievances and for arbitration was entered into while the
original paragraph of the section was in effect. As stated above, it
does not appear whether or not the parties had stipulated that the
act should apply. The supreme court gave no consideration, however,
to the point whether the original or amended paragraph of the section
was applicable. It proceeded directly to review and decide the whole
case as upon appeal from trial of a case involving breach of the
general agreement. If the court intended to condone the declaration
and ruling of the trial judge that the grievance and arbitral provisions
were revocable, it may be that the same ruling will go against an
arbitral provision which qualifies under the foregoing suggested con-
struction of the amendment. To do so, however, would seem to make
light of the view voiced by the supreme court in Hegeberg v. New
England Fish Co. that "A sound and well recognized public policy
strongly supports arbitration of disputes between employers and em-
ployees." The amendment, though somewhat awkward and ambiguous,
seems to have been intended to implement that policy.
It may be surmised that the supreme court in the Sullivan case
was most immediately concerned with what may have appeared to
it as inequities in the plaintiff's claim and that it did not intend neces-
sarily to confirm the blanket invalidation of arbitral provisions as
voiced by the trial judge. The court may, it seems, readily restore the
validity, irrevocability and enforceability of arbitral provisions quali-
fying under the suggested construction of the amendment by reading
it into the rest of the statute with its several remedies as outlined
above.
It seems doubtful that the court would be warranted in repudiating
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an award or in holding revocable an arbitration provision or submis-
sion which qualifies under the suggested construction of the amend-
ment of the second paragraph of the first section of the present
arbitration statute as it seems to have done in the Sullivan case. That
paragraph is specific that parties to an arbitration agreement "may
provide for any method and procedure for the settlement of existing
or future disputes or controversies" and that such procedure shall be
valid, enforceable and irrevocable." The latter part of this text sounds
in legislative mandate that the courts shall make such agreements
valid, enforceable and irrevocable. To accord the remedies of the
statute, as indicated above, seems to point the way to car.y out the
mandate. And certainly the constitutional competence of legislation
in making mandatory upon the courts the according of such remedies
seems fully assured.4'
44 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
